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1 Introduction
Africa is by far the poorest part of the world. Although a few African countries have ex-
perienced good economic development outcomes, it is clear that there have been failures
in developing sound policies in many African countries. In particular, African coun-
tries fair the worst in most rankings of dimensions of the business environment for long
term business success. Collier (2000) argues that the poor business environment leads to
misallocation of resources and high transactions costs in Africa affecting particularly man-
ufacturing firms. Bigsten and Soderbom (2006) finds that the poor business environment
limits the export growth of manufacturing firms.
In this paper, we focus on institutions and policies in Africa related to the business
environment that create inefficiencies in the firm level and the distortions in the allocation
of resources across firms. The development literature has shown that both channels are
important in accounting for cross-country income and TFP differences.1 In particular,
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) argues that a country’s policies and institutions can create
“taxes” or “subsidies” modeled as a tax or subsidy on output that distort the allocation
of resources across firms. In this paper, we follow this idea and measure most of our
indicators for business environment as a tax on output.
However, most of the countries in our sample don’t have enough information from the
data to directly measure the distribution of such taxes across firms. Instead, our baseline
experiments rely on an aggregate measure of the tax for each country and therefore the
tax affects all firms in a country uniformly. We use the countries with enough data to test
the robustness of the quantitative results with the homogenous tax rate. The heteroge-
nous tax rates across firms may lead to different quantitative implications through several
channels. For instance, if taxes are correlated with firm size there will be a reallocation
of resources across firms at certain direction and the effect will not be captured by the
homogenous tax rate. Also, if the distribution is very skewed on one side of the mean,
the quantitative implication of the heterogenous tax might be different. Fortunately, we
1See Parente and Prescott (1994); Howitt (2000); Herrendorf and Teixeira (2009); Fang (2009) for the
first channel and Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Amaral and Quintin (2009) for the second channel.
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find that taxes are largely uncorrelated with the level of employment, hence productiv-
ity. In addition, the skewedeness of the distributions in our testing cases are not large
enough, and therefore the quantitative effects of the heterogenous tax is very similar to
the homogenous tax.
We focus on five areas of the business environment: regulatory environment, crime,
corruption, access to infrastructure, and financial development. The first four factors are
measured as taxes on output and affect all firms uniformly in a country and therefore
will not affect capital accumulation. Financial development is modeled as enforcement
of contracts similar to Amaral and Quintin (2009). As Amaral and Quintin (2009) has
shown, lower enforcement creates tighter borrowing constraint and tighter borrowing
constraint leads to smaller production scale and misallocation of capital across production
units. Banerjee and Duﬄo (2005) suggests that such channel is important and can account
for the TFP and output gap between the US and India.
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES) ask firms to estimate the loss in sales due
to various polices and institutions (regulatory environment, crime, corruption and access
to infrastructure). We use those losses to construct a measures of the “tax” on output
emphasized by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). We view this as one of the contributions
of this paper. We find that the tax rates are sizeable along all the four dimensions and
varies greatly across countries. Specifically, the average tax rates for regulatory, crime,
corruption and infrastructure are 6.42%, 3.69%, 5.93%, and 6.57% and the average total
tax rate along all four dimensions is 22.61%. This implies that businesses in Africa lose
on average more than 20% of their sales due to the four indicators for poor business
environment. We use the domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
from the World Bank Global Development Finance database to measure the financial
development. The average value for African countries is only 10.35% of the U.S. level.
To quantify the effects of the five dimensions of business environment on African eco-
nomic development, we introduces the policy distortions highlighted by Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008) in the general equilibrium model studied by Amaral and Quintin (2009).
In the model, workers are born with a managerial ability and decide wether to operate
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a business. If they choose to do so, they can either use their own savings or borrow
to finance capital for production. A poor financial market leads to a tight borrowing
constraint. This leads to a smaller scale of operation and more smaller firms being op-
erated, hence to lower aggregate capital to output ratio and lower TFP. The other four
dimensions of the business environment are aggregated and modeled as a tax on output.
The tax on firms’s output lowers measured aggregate TFP and output directly.
We find that the quantitative effects of the areas of the business environment considered
here are large. A country with 10% financial intermediation relative to the US (which
is about the average for Africa) has only 62% of the US output, a relative capital to
output ratio of 34% and a relative average firm size of 31%. The dimensions acting like a
tax lower output and TFP significantly with no effects on capital output ratio and firm
size. With a 30% tax rate, relative output declines to 61% and relative TFP to 70%.
We simulate the model for each of the thirty African countries we study and find that
the five areas of the business environment together are able to explain about 67% of the
variation in income per worker relative to the US for these countries.
For the average African country, improving one or more dimensions of the business
environment can have large effects on the level of development. Improving financial
development alone by one standard deviation leads to a 7% increase in relative output
per worker. Cutting the tax rate by one standard deviation leads to 15% increase in
relative income per worker. A simultaneous improvement will lead to 22 percentage
points increase in relative income and to 15 percentage points increase in relative TFP.
Such improvements can go a long way in helping Africa decrease poverty and reach its
Millennium Development Goals.
Our robustness tests with heterogenous taxes use the data for Ghana and Senegal. For
each country, we use the inverse of the kernel distribution to draw samples of taxes that
mimic the distribution of the data as closely as possible. We then simulate the model
100 times and compute the average of the outcomes. We find that our results are very
close to the findings with the homogenous taxes.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, our paper is closely related to Alfaro et
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al. (2008) that tries to account for the role of distortions in income differences across-
countries. They introduce the type of distortions emphasized by Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) in a model of heterogenous firms based on Melitz (2003). Using firm data from
79 countries, they infer from the model the distortions needed to match the plant-size
distribution in each country. They then use these distortions to calculate the aggregate
loss in output. Our analysis differs from this paper in that we use a direct measure of the
distortions instead inferring them from the model. Another related paper is Bartelsman
et al. (2009) that uses firm data in a model with idiosyncratic distortions to study the
aggregate effects of the resulting misallocations.
There are a number of other authors emphasizing the effect of specific distortions on
TFP and output. Parente and Prescott (1994) and Herrendorf and Teixeira (2004) argues
that vested interests in the labor market can prevent firms from adopting more efficient
technologies. Lagos (2006) also studies the effects of frictions in the labor market on
aggregate TFP. Fang (2009) instead studies the role of entry barriers and competition
in the product market. Greenwood et al. (2010) and Buera and Shin (2010) studies
the misallocation caused by low financial development. Closely related to Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008), Guner et al. (2008) also studies the misallocation due to size restrictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
effects of different dimensions of the business environment. Section 3 describes the model
which is calibrated to the US economy in section 4. In section 5, we first construct the
tax rate for each country and then use the calibrated model to assess the quantitative im-
portance of business environment on output and TFP for African countries. We highlight
the conclusion and policy implications in section 6.
2 Literature Review on Areas of the Business
Environment
In this section, we review the literature on a few areas of the business environment. The
availability of cross-country data from the World Bank enterprise surveys since the 1990s
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has helped researchers investigate how firms and the aggregate economy are affected by
a poor business environment. The data has been mostly used to empirically test the
relationship of one area of the business environment with measures of firm success2.
The literature on the relationship between financial development and economic growth
and development is very large. Levine (2005) conducts a comprehensive review of the
theoretical and empirical work on this area. Finance has many functions among which
are the pooling and allocation of savings, the production of information and monitoring
of projects, diversification of risks and the facilitation of exchange of goods and services.
Each of these functions affects savings and investment, and the efficient allocation of
resources, hence economic growth. The theoretical papers model some of these functions
and show that financial frictions or poor financial development lead to low TFP and
output (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).
On the empirical side, many authors have shown that there is a strong correlation
between measures of financial development and economic growth (King and Levine, 1993;
Ndikumana, 2000) and this correlation is not due to simultaneity bias (Levine et al., 2000).
Financial development affects economic growth through increases in TFP, savings rate
and capital accumulation (Beck et al., 2000b). However, the effects of poor financial
development are not uniform across industries and size distribution of firms. Industries
that require more external financing grow faster in more financially developed countries
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Also, small firms are more severely affected by low financial
development and industries dominated by small firms for technological reasons grow faster
in countries with better financial development (Beck et al., 2008).
Another topic that has received a lot attention in the literature is corruption. While
few authors emphasize the positive effect of corruption through a decrease of the burden
of regulation and a potential increase in efforts by corrupted government officials (Leff,
1964); most authors argue that corruption cannot be limited to specific activities and
is overall very damaging to economic growth 3. Moreover, when talented people put
their efforts in rent-seeking instead of productive activities, overall efficiency and output
2e.g See Aterido et al. (2009) for a recent exception.
3See Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Bardhan (1997); Blackburn et al. (2006).
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decrease (Krueger, 1974; Murphy et al., 1991). Mauro (1995, 1996) and Knack and Keefer
(1995), using cross-country data, find that higher levels of corruption are associated with
lower investment shares and GDP growth rates; and the effects are large. Mauro (1995)
finds that a reduction in corruption by one standard deviation leads to five percentage
points increase in the investment to GDP ratio and to half percentage point increase in
GDP growth rate. For Africa, Gyimah-Brempong (2002) finds that a unit increase in
corruption reduces the level and growth rate of GDP per capita by respectively 0.4 and
0.66 percentage points.
Corruption affects output growth trough various channels but also has a direct link.
Mauro (1995, 1996) finds strong correlations with the investment rate and some com-
ponents of government expenditure like education and transfer payments. For Africa,
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2008) finds that corruption increases public invest-
ment but discourages private investment, and has a negative effect on income growth.
Other transmission channels are: lower government revenues, lower expenditures on op-
erations and maintenance, lower quality of public infrastructure and lower productivity
for public government expenditure (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
The effects of infrastructure provision is another issue that has attracted a lot of at-
tention in the literature. It is generally agreed that adequate supply benefits firms and
increases productivity growth (Morisson and Scwartz, 1996). The effects on the aggre-
gate economy is also found to be positive and significant but there is some debate on
the magnitude and the net effects (Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003; Canning and Pedroni,
2008). Fernald (1999) finds evidence from the US that investment in roads enhances
productivity. (Fan and Chan-Kang, 2005) finds that the huge investments in roads in
China helped GDP growth and the effects on poverty reduction in rural areas are very
large.
In Africa, the supply of infrastructure is very low. Poor infrastructure increases trans-
action costs and makes African firms less competitive than their international coun-
terparts. The costs of transportation, logistics, telecommunication, water, electricity,
security, bribes are high and firms suffer great losses due to transportation problems,
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outages of power and water and crime (Eifert et al., 2005). Collier and Gunning (2000)
argues that the poor infrastructure is a serious constraint to growth in Africa. A recent
economic brief by the African Development Bank (Mafusire, 2010) argues that Africa
has large deficit in infrastructure and its improvement can have large spillover effects for
development and poverty reduction in the continent. Gollin and Rogerson (2010) sug-
gests that decreasing transportation costs would be important for improving agricultural
productivity in Uganda. Using cross-country data, Calderon (2009) finds that increasing
infrastructure stock will have a large payoff for Africa.
3 The Model
The model is based on Amaral and Quintin (2009), which quantifies the effects of poor
financial development on output and productivity. The framework is a discrete-time
overlapping generations model. In each period, a mass one of two-period lived agents are
born. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time each period. Each agent is born with
a managerial ability z ∈ Z, which is constant over an agent’s life. Managerial talent is
public information and the distribution g(z) is the same across generations. In the first
period, the agent can only be a worker, but has the option to be a manager in the second
period. The utility function of an agent is given by:
U(c1, c2) = log(c1) + β log(c2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
A manager with ability z combines labor and capital into a single consumption good
using a decreasing return to scale technology described as follows:
F (k, l) = zkθlµ (1)
where θ + µ < 1. To incorporate the effects of distortions emphasized by Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008), we assume that a fraction τ of output is lost due to poor business
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environment. Initially, we assume that τ is the same for all firms in a country. τ acts
like a proportional tax on output where the proceeds are thrown away. In this paper, we
use τ to denote the sales lost due to red-tape regulations, poor infrastructure, crime and
corruption. In reality, τ might be different across firms and this may distort the allocation
of resources across firms and therefore has an impact on TFP and output as discussed
by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). Later, we use a tax rate distribution generated from
the data to show that our results are not driven by the use of a homogenous tax rate.
We assume that capital needs to be paid before production takes place. A manager
can finance capital either through personal savings a from the first period or through
external borrowing at rate r.4 We assume that capital fully depreciates after each period.
As it becomes clear in the calibration, one period in the model is twenty years, hence this
assumption is not unreasonable.
The solution to this problem has been discussed by Amaral and Quintin (2009). Here,
we formulate the problem and discuss a few predictions before turning to the quantitative
effects. Let b be the amount borrowed by a manager and w be the wage rate. The profit
for a manager with ability z, savings a, and capital k = a+ b is giving by5:
pi(k, z;w, r, τ) = max
l
(1− τ)zkθlµ − wl − k(1 + r)
The financial market is imperfect as managers have the option to default. If a manger
defaults, a fraction η of his assets is lost. Since there is no uncertainty in this model,
the financial intermediary will impose a debt limit so that the managers find it rational
not to default in the equilibrium. Therefore a financial contract for a manger of ability z
4Amaral and Quintin (2009) explored a version where the interest rate is endogenously determined and
found that the patterns of output resembles to the benchmark formulation but the effect of financial
constraint is larger with the endogenous interest rate.
5We implicitly assume that firms will use all their savings to finance capital before turning to the
financial market. The reason for this are two folds. First, it is generally cheaper to use the internal
funds to finance capital. Second, Amaral and Quintin (2009) proves that the financially constrained
firm will use all their savings to finance capital.
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with savings a ≥ 0 solves:
max
b≥0
pi(a+ b, z;w, r, τ)
s.t pi(a+ b, z;w, r, τ) + a(1 + r) ≥
(1− η) [pi(a+ b, z;w, r, τ) + (a+ b)(1 + r)]
Simple manipulation of the above constraint gives:
b ≤ η
1− η
pi(k, z;w, r, τ) + a(1 + r)
1 + r
This inequality defines a debt limit for a manager with ability z and savings a. It is
easy to see that lower financial development (low η) and higher taxes (poor business
environment) both lead to lower borrowing limit, hence to lower capital and output.
The problem of young agents is as follows:
max
c1,c2,a
log(c1) + β log(c2)
s.t: c1 + a = w
c2 = a(1 + r) + max(w, pi(a+ b, z;w, r, τ))
where pi(a+b, z;w, r, τ) is the net profit for a manager with savings a and ability z subject
to the borrowing constraint.
The income in the second period takes into account that an agent has a choice of
occupation. Since pi(a+ b, z;w, r, τ) is increasing in z, the young agent’s problem implies
that there is an ability threshold, z(η, w, r, τ), such that below which agents become
workers and above which agents become managers.
4 Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model to the US economy. The calibration procedure
follows Amaral and Quintin (2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).
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A period in the model is 20 years corresponding to 40 years of work life for an individual.
The yearly interest rate is set to 4% implying r = 1.0420− 1 and β = ( 1
1.04
)20
. According
to the literature, the return to scale of the production function, α + µ, is around 0.85
and we set α and µ to match the capital and labor shares of income. From US data,
capital share is 1/3 of the return to scale which implies that α = 0.85/3 = 0.283 and
µ = 0.85 ∗ 2/3 = 0.567.
The distribution of managerial talent will determine the size distribution of establish-
ments. We assume that managerial talent follows a log-normal distribution with 100 grid
points. We choose the range of skills to match the range of employment in the data.
Normalizing the lowest skill to be one, the maximum skill is chosen to get a maximum
employment to be 10,000 as in the 2007 US census data. The data also shows that 73%
of establishments have less than 10 employees while only 2.3% have more than 100 em-
ployees and the the average employment level is 15.65. We choose the mean and standard
deviation of the distribution to match these features of the data. Although we only target
a few moments of the establishment size distribution, the implied distribution from the
calibration matches the data well as shown in the Figures 1 and 2.
The last parameter to calibrate is the degree of contract enforcement (η) which deter-
mines the ratio of intermediated capital to output. From the model’s perspective, capital
is financed by own savings and external borrowing, therefore intermediated capital is just
the borrowed funds. The corresponding statistic in the data is hard to measure. Amaral
and Quintin (2009) used data from Beck et al. (2000a) and added credit from banks and
other financial institutions, outstanding debt securities issued by private institutions and
new equity issues. Deducting the portion of credit from banks going to consumers, they
find a ratio of intermediated capital to output of 2.2.
For our sample of countries, it is hard to use this data because of the lack of informa-
tion on credit going to consumers. Instead, we use the variable domestic credit to the
private sector (% GDP) from the World Bank Global Development Finance database
which measures financial resources provided to the private sector (e.g loans, purchases
of nonequity securities, and trade credits) that establish a claim for repayment. For the
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US, the average ratio from 2000 to 2005 is 1.86. This value is close to the estimation by
McGrattan and Prescott (2000) of 1.84.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values.
5 Quantitative Implications for African Countries
5.1 Business Environment for Sub-Saharan Africa
Before we turn to the quantitative implications of the model, we discuss the business
environment data for 30 Sub-Saharan countries. The data on GDP per worker is from
the Penn World Table 7.0. As noted above, our measure of financial development is from
the World Bank Global Development Finance database, and is the average domestic
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP for the years 2000-2005. The rest of
the data for the business environment comes from the World Bank Enterprize Surveys
(ES). The ES database contains firm level data for more than 10000 firms across 125
countries. The core questionnaire of the survey is the same across all countries. We focus
on the impact of regulation, crime, access to infrastructure, and corruption. For most of
these dimensions, the database contains the percentage of total sales lost due to a specific
policy or institution.
The impact of red-tape regulation on firms is measured by the time managers spent
dealing with various government regulations. The effect of crime is measured by the
percentage of sales lost due to theft, robbery, vandalism and arson, the percentage of
sales paid for security, and the percentage of products shipped to domestic markets lost
due to theft. The infrastructure development is measured by the percentage of sales lost
due to power outages and the percentage of shipment lost during transit. Corruption is
measured by informal payments as a percentage of sales.
These four dimensions of the business environment act like a tax and affect output
directly through lower TFP. In our baseline analysis, we compute the country average for
6This value does not include new equity issues because its not available in World development finance
database. However, data from both Beck et al. (2000a) and Federal Reserve Board indicate that for
the US, new issues of equity is around 1% of GDP. This omission will underestimate the quantitative
difference between African countries and the US but by very little.
11
each dimension and add them to measure the total “homogenous tax rate” used in the
model. Later, we will analyze the effects of heterogenous tax rates across establishments.
Table 2 shows the statistics for the 30 countries. In most countries, managers spend
a large fraction of their time dealing with government regulations. The average is 6.4%
with a large variation across countries. Managers in Coˆte d’Ivoire spend the least time,
1.81% while in Madagascar they spend up to 17.12% of their time dealing with the
regulations. Crime is the least costly factor to firms among the factors considered here.
The average security costs and percentage of sales lost due to various crimes is 3.70%
with a minimum of 1.16% in Benin and a maximum of 9.89% in Coˆte d’Ivoire. The most
costly dimension of the business environment is poor infrastructure. Firms on average
lose 6.60% of their sales due to power outages and transportation failures. The minimum
losses are in Ethiopia and the maximum in Guinea, where power outages occur daily
and variation in voltage causes fires. Corruption is also costly to firms in Africa. On
average, firms spend almost 6.00% of annual sales on informal payment. The sum of
these four dimensions are quite high. Businesses lose on average one fifth of their sales.
The variation across countries is also high. The standard deviation is 8.6 percentage
points.
Access to finance is a huge issue for African firms. Beck et al. (2009) points to the
shallowness of the financial system in Africa despite recent progress. The average financial
intermediation of capital is 10.35% of the US level if we include South Africa, otherwise
it is 8.23%. The variation across countries are also large: 13.56% with South Africa and
7.14% without it. South Africa is by far the most financially developed African country.
Other countries with high levels of capital intermediation include Cape Verde, Mauritius,
Kenya and Coˆte d’Ivoire.
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between the five areas of the business envi-
ronment and with log of GDP per worker in 2005. Given that the sample from Africa is
relatively small, we used a larger sample to calculate the correlations7. Our larger sample
7We used the aggregate indicators from the ES database. For regulation, we used the average number
of visits or required meetings with tax officials. For corruption, we used the percentage of firms
expected to make informal payments to get things done. The payments as a share of sales is not
available as an aggregate indicator.
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includes 123 countries and most of them are developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin
America and Eastern Europe.
From the table, we see that high burden of regulation, losses due to crime, corruption
and poor infrastructure are all positively correlated. It has been long argued that one
source of corruption is heavy regulation, which gives opportunities to bureaucrats to
demand informal payments. High level of corruption is also an indication of a poor
functioning law and judicial system. This leads to high level of insecurity and larger losses
due to crime. A country with high level of informal payments by firms is an indication that
corruption maybe rampant in other sectors like government projects. This leads to low
effective investment in power generation and roads. As noted earlier, Tanzi and Davoodi
(1997) finds that high levels of corruption lowers government revenues, expenditures
on operations and maintenance, quality of public infrastructure and productivity for
public government expenditure. As we may expect all of these four areas are negatively
correlated with income per worker. On the other hand, the level of financial development
is positively correlated with income. Firms in richer countries get more financing form
banks and other financial institutions.
5.2 Impact of the Homogenous Tax and Poor Financial
Development
In this section, we feed the statistics of the business environment discussed above to
the calibrated model to assess their impact for each of the 30 African countries. The
“homogenous tax” is the sum of the average for regulation, crime, infrastructure and
corruption. At the same time, we also recalibrate η for each country to match the
corresponding debt to GDP ratio in the data.
Before discussing the results for all countries, we first conduct a few experiments to
highlight the general effects of the tax channel and financial development using the cali-
brated economy. The results are reported in table 4. In the first experiment, we look at
the effects of tax rates ranging from 10% to 40%, which correspond roughly to the range
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for African countries8. When the tax rate increases to 10%, output and TFP decline
respectively to 86% and 90% of the benchmark. Output is more than halved with 40%
tax rate while TFP declines to 60% of the benchmark. These values show that the impact
of these dimensions of the business environment are large and they affect both output
and productivity. However, they do not affect capital to output ratio and the average
size of firms.
In the second experiment, we vary financial intermediation relative to the benchmark
economy. The effects on output are sizable. When relative financial intermediation is at
40%, output declines to 77% of the benchmark. The transmission channels are lower TFP
and lower capital to output ratio with a much bigger effect on the latter. We also see that
there is a substantial decline in average firm size. When financial intermediation is at 5%
of the US level, output and TFP decline respectively to 56% and 86% of the benchmark
with capital to output ratio at 31% and average firm size at 30% of the benchmark.
In the last panel of table 4, we show the effects of the business environment using the
average statistics for the thirty African countries 9. With a tax rate of 23% and relative
financial development of 8.23% , output falls to 42% of the US. While TFP (68% of the
benchmark) contributes to lower output, capital to output ratio plays a bigger role, it
falls to 32% of the benchmark. Decreasing the tax rate by one standard deviation to
15% raises relative output to 48% and relative TFP to 75% with no change on capital
to output ratio and average firm size. A one standard deviation improvement of the
financial development increases relative output to 45%, relative TFP to 71% and capital
to output ratio to 35%. However, if we make a simultaneous one standard deviation
improvement of the tax and financial development, output for Africa will increase to 51%
and productivity to 78% of the US level. This is a 22% increase in income per capita
and 15% increase in TFP. Such increases can have big effects on poverty reduction and
economic development.
Table 5 reports relative output and TFP for each of the 30 countries. While the model
is too stylized to match the data on relative income per worker for each country, it is able
8The tax rate for the US economy is set to zero.
9We exclude South Africa when measuring the average relative capital intermediation.
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to explain a large variation of income across countries. Following Amaral and Quintin
(2009), we use v = 1−
∑
i (yˆi−yi)∑
i (1−yi) as a measure of the dispersion of output captured by the
model, where yˆi is relative income per worker in the model and yi the corresponding value
from the data. With this measure, the model explains 67% of dispersion of income per
capita. With only financial development in their model, Amaral and Quintin (2009) was
able to explain a third of the income variation in their sample which included only middle
and high income countries. Adding the other dimensions of the business environment
increases the explanatory power of the model.
5.3 Impact of the Heterogenous Tax
In the previous section, we used the average losses for the four dimensions of the business
environment. But our model features firms with heterogenous productivities and can
easily include heterogenous tax rates across firms. Here we show that our results don’t
hinges on our use of homogenous taxes.
Our use of homogenous taxes in the previous section was motivated by data constraints.
While the Enterprise surveys contain information at the firm level, it is not straightfor-
ward for many countries to figure out the distribution of the total tax due to missing data.
In any country, a given firm i may indicate losses due to regulation and infrastructure
but has missing data for crime and corruption. Therefore if we restrict our sample to
firms reporting all the areas of the business environment, we can end up with a much
smaller sample. In practice, we find that the majority of missing data is related to crime
and subset of infrastructure. We therefore use data from the areas with the least missing
data to infer the distribution. We add a constant to this initial distribution such that
the mean of the final distribution is equal to the homogenous tax used earlier.
After computing the distribution of taxes, we ask if it is correlated with firm size. This
question is important because Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) found that the quantitative
effects of correlated distortions are much larger than those of uncorrelated distortions. In
our data, we find that while specific distortions may be positively correlated with firm
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size, the correlations don’t hold at the aggregate level for most countries10.
Despite the fact that our distortions are uncorrelated with firm size, heterogenous taxes
can lead to different results if the distribution is highly skewed on one side. For instance,
if the majority of firms have small taxes but few have large ones, using a constant tax
overestimates the loss in output.
To illustrate the effects of heterogenous distortions, we show the cases of Ghana and
Senegal. These two countries have large population of firms in the database. Therefore,
large sample remains even after eliminating the missing data. For each country, we use
the inverse of a kernel distribution to draw a sample of 100 tax rates corresponding to
the 100 grid points for managerial skill. We simulate the model 100 times and report the
average outcomes.
For Ghana, there is no correlation between distortions and employment. Therefore, our
distribution of taxes is not correlated with managerial skill. We use the kernel distribution
to draw random samples very close to the data in a flexible manner. Figure 3 shows that
the distributions of the tax from the data and a random sample are very similar. The
figure also shows that the distribution is slightly skewed to the left. Table 6 reports
the results of the simulation. It shows that the difference between the homogenous and
heterogenous tax is quite small. Relative GDP increases from 46% in the case of the
homogenous tax to 47% in the case of heterogenous tax. This small change is due to the
skewedeness of the distribution.
For Senegal, the distortions are positively correlated with employment but with a
correlation coefficient of 0.12. We conduct two experiments. First, as the case for Ghana,
we simulate the model 100 times with random samples of taxes non correlated with
skill. Second, we sort each random sample in ascending order such that less productive
firms face lower taxes. The second panel of table 6 shows that heterogenous taxes non
correlated with skill lead to the same relative GDP per worker as the homogenous case.
But when small firms face lower taxes, as in the second experiment, relative income per
worker increases from 48% to 52%. This result confirm the finding by Restuccia and
10For example, managers in large firm spend more time dealing with government regulation compared
to their counterparts in small firms.
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Rogerson (2008). However, the data for Senegal does not really point to such a case as
the correlation between distortions and employment is only 0.12. In figure 4, we plot
the distribution of taxes by firm size in the data and in the model. For each simulation,
we calculate the average tax rate for a size category, then take the averages for the 100
simulations. The figure shows that taxes from the uncorrelated case are much closer
to the data than those from the correlated case. The average of the 100 samples for
non-correlated taxes are 18% for each size category while the average homogenous tax is
17.8%.
Given that none of the countries in our sample has a high correlation between distor-
tions and employment, we feel confident that our results with homogenous taxes don’t
exaggerate the amount of losses from the areas of the business environment considered
here.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper shows how various dimensions of the business environment affect income per
capita in thirty African countries. We find that the poor business environment discussed
in various papers in the literature are quite damaging for African development. Busi-
nesses lose large shares of their sales due to government regulation, poor infrastructure,
corruption and crimes. The implications of the losses are lower aggregate output and
total factor productivity for the countries. Low financial development measured as inter-
mediated capital relative to output contributes greatly to the poor performance of Africa.
It leads to low aggregate capital, hence a predominance of small firms and low total factor
productivity.
While some improvements of the business environment are costly and will take long
time to achieve, others can be achieved with little costs if there is strong political will. For
example, the time managers spend dealing with government regulation can be decreased
by simplifying the regulatory environment. Governments can simplify their tax codes and
make it easier to pay taxes, reform labor laws and decrease the number of licenses and
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various inspections. The more regulation and bureaucracy a government puts in place,
the more opportunities for bureaucrats to be involved in corruption. At the same time
it gives incentive to firms to be involved in corruption especially if the chances of being
caught and punished are low. Also reforming the judicial system to make them more
efficient in punishing corrupt officials and criminals can decrease the levels of corruption
and crime.
Improving the quantity and quality of infrastructure has great potential for African’s
long term development but it is costly. Building more roads, rail and generating more
electrical power require large investments. Countries need to explore new financing mech-
anisms, like public private partnerships, instituting toll roads, mineral deposits versus
infrastructure and so on. The improvements will take a long time to achieve but they
have to be in the continent’s long term development strategy.
Improving access to credit for businesses is another difficult but necessary ingredient for
Africa’s long term development. This can be achieved by changes in the banking and fi-
nancial regulations to encourage more savings, to make the resolution of disputes between
lenders and borrowers more efficient, and to provide more information on the borrower’s
background. Moreover, for finance to play an important role in African economies, costs
and interest rates spreads have to decrease substantially. Governments have an impor-
tant role to play in making this sector more efficient. Beck et al. (2009) points to some
necessary institutional and policy changes for the sector.
In summary, this paper points to key institutions and policies making the business
environment in Africa unfriendly and quantifies their effects on output and TFP. To
achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by half by 2015, the African
countries need to make changes to make the business environment friendly for business
creation and growth.
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Parameter Values
β α µ r ηUS gmean gstd
0.4565 0.2833 0.5667 1.1911 0.582 -0.45 1.05
Table 2: Business Environment Statistics for Africa
Country regulation Crime Infra-
structure
Corrup-
tion
Total
“Tax”
Finance rel.
to US (%)
AGO 7.14 2.84 5.03 6.92 21.93 2.4
BEN 6.46 1.16 6.45 0.00 14.07 7.38
BWA 4.96 3.46 2.58 8.35 19.35 9.64
BFA 9.53 1.46 3.86 0.00 14.85 7.48
BDI 5.70 2.53 10.94 7.83 27.00 14.77
CMR 12.80 2.97 5.59 0.00 21.36 4.96
CPV 12.17 2.46 4.31 0.00 18.94 20.23
ZAR 6.31 2.89 5.55 6.08 20.83 0.63
COG 5.92 7.73 15.70 19.21 48.56 2
CIV 1.81 9.89 6.53 11.32 29.55 8.13
ETH 3.77 3.27 1.53 0.00 8.57 11.85
GAB 3.02 3.00 1.80 9.64 17.46 5.49
GMB 7.31 6.93 12.92 9.50 36.66 7.79
GHA 4.03 2.84 7.13 3.36 17.36 7.32
GIN 2.65 3.01 15.27 6.63 27.56 2.35
GNB 2.87 2.62 5.25 7.54 18.28 1.55
KEN 5.12 6.06 7.81 4.61 23.60 14.49
LSO 5.73 7.42 5.95 6.77 25.87 6.37
LBR 8.51 7.06 3.67 7.18 26.42 2.58
MDG 17.12 3.98 8.88 0.00 29.98 4.98
MLI 2.39 1.30 2.71 5.74 12.14 10.13
MRT 5.84 1.50 2.91 8.17 18.42 14.02
MUS 9.36 4.56 3.54 7.13 24.59 36.53
NER 11.45 1.23 4.50 0.00 17.18 3.02
NGA 6.06 5.91 12.16 5.27 29.40 7.48
RWA 5.92 3.30 9.93 6.31 25.46 5.86
SEN 2.90 1.71 6.38 6.82 17.81 10.90
ZAF 5.95 2.59 1.60 9.84 19.98 71.810
UGA 5.21 2.58 11.65 7.28 26.72 4.28
ZMB 4.55 2.47 4.87 6.52 18.41 4.14
Mean 6.42 3.69 6.57 5.93 22.61 10.350
Std. dev 3.47 2.24 3.96 4.27 7.78 13.56
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Table 3: Correlation Coefficients
regulation crime infras-
tructure
corrup-
tion
finance logGDP
regulation 1.00 0.18 0.15 0.43 -0.06 -0.15
crime 1.00 0.45 0.20 -0.26 -0.32
infrastructure 1.00 0.36 -0.30 -0.43
corruption 1.00 - 0.31 -0.42
finance 1.00 0.53
Table 4: Benchmark Experiments
Relative
GDP
Relative
TFP
Rel. Capi-
tal Output
ratio
Relative
Average
firm size
Taxes
10% 0.86 0.90 1.00 1.00
20% 0.73 0.80 1.00 1.00
30% 0.61 0.70 1.00 1.00
40% 0.49 0.60 1.00 1.00
Financial intermediation relative to US
40% 0.77 0.99 0.49 0.54
20% 0.66 0.94 0.36 0.40
10% 0.62 0.89 0.34 0.31
5% 0.56 0.86 0.31 0.30
Average Africa
Mean finance and tax 0.42 0.68 0.32 0.31
Decrease tax by 1
std. dev.
0.48 0.75 0.32 0.31
Increase finance by 1
std. dev.
0.45 0.71 0.35 0.35
Improve both 0.51 0.78 0.35 0.35
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Table 5: Results for 30 African Countries
Rel.
GDP
Rel.
TFP
Rel. Capital
Output ratio
Rel. Average
firm size
Angola 0.41 0.66 0.32 0.27
Benin 0.48 0.75 0.32 0.31
Botswana 0.46 0.71 0.34 0.31
Burkina Faso 0.48 0.75 0.32 0.31
Burundi 0.41 0.67 0.34 0.35
Cameroon 0.40 0.68 0.31 0.30
Cape Verde 0.50 0.77 0.36 0.40
D.R. Congo 0.41 0.67 0.31 0.27
Rep. of Congo 0.23 0.43 0.32 0.27
Cote d’Ivoire 0.37 0.62 0.33 0.31
Ethiopia 0.57 0.82 0.35 0.31
Gabon 0.44 0.72 0.31 0.30
Gambia 0.32 0.56 0.32 0.31
Ghana 0.46 0.72 0.32 0.31
Guinea 0.37 0.61 0.32 0.27
Guinea-Bissau 0.43 0.69 0.32 0.27
Kenya 0.44 0.70 0.34 0.35
Lesotho 0.39 0.65 0.31 0.31
Liberia 0.38 0.62 0.32 0.27
Madagascar 0.37 0.60 0.33 0.27
Mali 0.52 0.78 0.34 0.31
Mauritania 0.48 0.75 0.34 0.35
Mauritius 0.51 0.74 0.46 0.54
Niger 0.45 0.70 0.32 0.27
Nigeria 0.37 0.62 0.32 0.31
Rwanda 0.41 0.64 0.33 0.28
Senegal 0.48 0.73 0.35 0.31
South Africa 0.66 0.80 0.74 0.85
Uganda 0.39 0.63 0.33 0.27
Zambia 0.45 0.70 0.33 0.27
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Table 6: Impact of Heterogenous Tax
Relative
GDP
Relative
TFP
Rel. Capi-
tal Output
ratio
Relative
Average
firm size
Ghana
Homogenous 17.36% 0.46 0.72 0.32 0.31
Heterogenous, non
correlated with skill
0.47 0.74 0.32 0.27
Senegal
Homogenous 17.81% 0.48 0.73 0.35 0.31
Heterogenous, non
correlated with skill
0.48 0.75 0.33 0.30
Heterogenous, corre-
lated with skill
0.52 0.78 0.34 0.31
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Figure 1: Distribution of establishments by employment levels-Model vs. Data
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